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3Preface
In 1997, ECMI initiated several series of regional seminars dealing with
areas where inter-ethnic tension was a matter of international concern or
where ethnopolitical conflicts had broken out. The first event was an ECMI
Black Sea Seminar “From Ethnopolitical Conflict to Inter-Ethnic Accord in
Moldova” which brought together policy makers, intellectuals and
entrepreneurs from Moldova and its utonomist and separatist peripheries
of Gagauzia and Trans-D iestria. In 1998, three more seminar series were
launched: An ECMI West European Seminar “Insular Regions and
European Integration: Corsica and the Åland Islands Compared,” an ECMI
East Central European Seminar “Inter-Ethnic Relations in Transcarpathian
Ukraine,” and an ECMI Baltic Seminar “Minorities and Majorities in
Estonia: Problems of Integration at the Threshold of EU.”
This seminar was skilfully organized by ECMI Senior Analyst Dr. Priit
Järve, who was efficiently assisted by Mrs Christine Pearce-Jahre, ECMI
programme coordinator. It took place from 22 to 25 May 1998 on both
sides of the Danish-German border, in Aabenraa (Apenrade), Denmark,
and Flensburg (Flensborg), Germany. It brought together representatives of
the Estonian government, members of the Russian community in Estonia,
officials of international organizations as well as experts from a variety of
academic disciplines focusing on the Baltic countries.
The outcome of this intense seminar is contained in this report. ECMI takes
full responsibility for the report, which has not been reviewed by the
seminar participants. However, the opinions presented in the report do not
necessarily reflect the views of ECMI. The target orient dness and
constructivity of the seminar participants are best illustrated by three facts:
First, a heated controversy between a Western expert and the Head of the
OSCE Mission to Estonia resulted in an invitation by the latter to the
former to observe the mission on the spot. The result of this exercise, which
was co-financed by ECMI, will be published as an ECMI Working Paper.
Secondly, the participants of the seminar agreed on the necessity of follow-
up seminars, - preferably in Estonia.* And thirdly, in 1998, consultations
between ECMI and Estonian Government officials started in order to work
out a permanent basis for future cooperation.
Stefan Troebst
ECMI Director 1996-1998
                                                     
* The first follow-up seminar took place in Tallinn on 8-9 January 1999. The seminar adopted a
consensus-backed Statement (see http://www.ecmi.de/activities/tallinn_statement.htm).
4     Ethnic Composition of the Estonian Population as of 1 January 1998
Ethnic group Number %
Estonians 946,646 65.22
Russians 409,111 28.19
Ukrainians   36,929 2.54
Belarussians   21,589 1.49
Finns   13,317 0.92
Tatars     3,271 0.22
Latvians     2,691 0.19
Jews     2,423 0.17
Lithuanians     2,221 0.15
Germans     1,288 0.09
Others    12,003 0.82
TOTAL 1,451,489 100.00
Source: Baltic News Service, 24 August 1998
5Note on Terminology
This report reflects the current Estonian usage of terms related to ethnicity
and nationality (citizenship). This usage is typical in countries where ethnic
nations prevail and civic ones are in formation, especially in the Eastern
part of Europe. Although the working language of the seminar was English,
misinterpretation might occur if the following semantic peculiarities are not
taken into account.
In the text of this report terms such as ‘Estonian’, ‘Estonians’, ‘Russian’,
‘Russians’, ‘German’, ‘Germans’, ‘Jew’, ‘Jews’, ‘Latvian’, ‘Latvians’, etc.,
follow the usage in the Estonian language by referring to the ethnic origin
of persons, not to their citizenship. To avoid misunderstandings, terms such
as ‘Estonian citizen’ or ‘citizen of Estonia’, ‘Russian citizen’ or ‘citizen of
the Russian Federation’ etc., are used when citizenship is referred to. The
terms ‘non-Estonian’ and ‘non-Estonians’ are often used in Estonia to refer
to people who are not ethnic Estonians, regardless of their citizenship.
Some of them are citizens of Estonia, some of them are not. The main point
here is the ethnic origin, which is perceived as different from that of the
ethnic Estonians.
The term ‘Russian-speakers’ (or ‘Russian-speaking population’) used in
this report is common in contemporary non-academic and academic
discourse. In David D. Laitin’s fundamental Identity in Formation. The
Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. (Cornell University
Press, 1998, 417 p.), the term appears in the heading of the book. This term
denotes millions of former Soviet citizens who predominantly use Russian
in their everyday life and who have been living outside the Russian
Federation since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, mostly in the former
Soviet republics. However, the term is not precise as to their ethnic origin,
mother tongue or current citizenship. For instance, most of the Ukrainians
and Belarussians but also many Jews in Estonia, let alone Russians, are
Russian-speakers. People are grouped together under the term ‘Russian-
speakers’ because they have similar identity problems and have to cope
with the official language policies of their countries of residence. The term
is often criticized on political grounds for masking diverse needs of various
ethnic groups and for promoting the hegemony of ethnic Russians in
dealing with minority issues.
While this seminar’s paper-givers are mentioned personally in the report,
only the country of origin, as a rule, identifies participants in the
discussions.
6Background
Estonia has been a multi-ethnic country for centuries. In 1989, when the
last census was taken, there were people of about one hundred different
ethnic origins living in Estonia (see Table 2 in the Appendix). As of 1
January 1998, according to the Estonian Statistical Board, Estonia’s
population stood at 1,451,489 of whom 946,646 or 65.2 per cent, were
ethnic Estonians. The biggest non-Estonian groups were Russians (409,111
persons or 28.2 per cent of the total population), Ukrainians (36,929 or 2.5
per cent), Belarussians (21,589 or 1.5 per cent), Finns (13,317 or 0.92 per
cent), Tatars (3,271 or 0.22 per cent), Latvians (2,691 or 0.19 per cent),
Jews (2,423 or 0.17 per cent) and Lithuanians (2,221 or 0.15 per cent).
Other ethnic groups were smaller than 1,300 people each. Russians
constituted 80 per cent of all non-Estonians living in Estonia. The non-
Estonians (504,843 persons or 34.8 per cent of the total population) mostly
came to Estonia under the Soviet regime and communicate in Russian,
which is why they are often grouped together under the common term
‘Russian-speaking population’.No major changes in the ethnic composition
of Estonian population have been reported since the beginning of 1998.
However, it should be stressed that, under the Soviet regime, the share of
Estonians in the ethnic composition of the population declined significantly
from about 90 per cent in 1945 to about 60 per cent in 1989. It happened
due to substantial flows of immigration from the Soviet Union – a
movement which was engineered from Moscow. Among ethnic Estonians
this drastic drop generated existential fears, suspicions about Russians as
potential assimilators, and contributed to exclusionist citizenship policies
after the restoration of state independence. The strategy of national survival
under the Soviets, mostly founded on the Estonian culture and language,
added to this exclusionary enterprise.
The history of the Estonians has created their general disposition for
ethnicity-based citizenship. This occurred because the Estonian nation was
formed and Estonian national identity was constructed largely on the basis
of language, before the Estonians were able to establish and maintain their
own state in 1918-1940, after which the Soviet Union annexed it.
The political choice that Estonia made during the dissolution of the Soviet
Union was not to build a new state but to restore the pre-war Estonian
Republic. In the eyes of Estonians this restitution provided the ultimate
justification for the subsequent Laws on Citizenship, adopted in 1992 and
1995, which followed the principles of ius sanguinis and naturalization.
Here restitution means that only persons who were citizens, or at least one
7of whose ancestors was a citizen, of the Republic of Estonia on June 16,
1940, when the Soviet troops invaded Estonia and the independent
statehood of Estonia ceased de facto to exist, have the right to Estonian
citizenship, regardless of their ethnic origin.
Therefore, in 1992, almost half a million people in Estonia - immigr nts
from the Soviet Union - were not entitled to Estonian citizenship.
Although they could become citizens through naturalization, they had to
meet the requirements of an Estonian language test. Indeed. the latter has
proved the main obstacle to naturalization as nearly one quarter of the
Russians living in Estonia do not speak any Estonian. This is a legacy of
the Soviet period when teaching local languages to Russians was regarded
as unimportant and the necessary motivation was lacking. As the poor
command of Estonian among Russians was a well-known fact, critics of
Estonian citizenship legislation have claimed that the real aim of the
language requirements was to exclude as many Russian-speakers from
politics and large scale privatization for as long as possible.
While the current naturalization process can be viewed as a politically
motivated, cautious and reluctant inclusion, there are cases in which
naturalization is ruled out altogether. Explicit refusal to grant citizenship is
stipulated in Article 21 of the Estonian Law on Citizenship (adopted on
January 19, 1995). It applies to six categories of persons: (1) those who
have knowingly submitted false information in applying for citizenship; (2)
those who do not observe the constitutional state system of Estonia; (3)
those who have acted against the state of Estonia and its security; (4) those
who have been sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year
for a criminal offence and who are not considered as rehabilitated with a
spent sentence or who have been punished repeatedly for an intentional
criminal offence; (5) those who were or are employed by the intelligence or
security service of a foreign state; and (6) those who have served in a
career position in the armed forces of a foreign state and their spouses. All
these persons are not eligible for Estonian citizenship if not Estonian
citizens by birth.
The Russian-speaking individuals in Estonia have many problems if their
knowledge of the Estonian language is poor or lacking. In addition to
blocking their way to Estonian citizenship, it restricts opportunities on the
labour market, adding to unemployment. All this gives birth to an acute
sense of insecurity regarding the future. Inability to take an active part in
political life only deepens the insecurity of non-citizens. Persons without
Estonian citizenship can neither belong to the political parties, nor vote or
be elected to the parliament. However, in contrast to some other states,
8permanent non-citizen residents can vote at local elections. Paradoxically,
as noted in the Estonian Human Development Report 1997 (UNDP:
Tallinn, 1997, p.63), while Estonian as an official language should
integrate society, in Estonia's multi-ethnic environment it works so far as a
culturally, socially and politically segregating factor. It is hoped that the
solution will come with time and predominantly through the educational
system.
The 1992 national elections resulted in a Parliament (the Riigikogu), which
was 99 percent ethnic Estonian. There was no formalised dialogue between
government and minorities until the President’s Roundtable on Minorities
was established amid the crisis with local elections of 1993 in north-eastern
Estonia where the Russian-speakers constitute a majority. In 1995, when
six ethnic Russians were elected to the Parliament, the situation was
somewhat relieved but the status of non-citizens remained a serious
concern.
In the debate on Estonian citizenship two opposite views have emerged.
The Estonian side justifies the existing legislation articulating collective
rights of ethnic Estonians on their historical territory, stressing the need to
protect Estonian culture and to undo the injustice that the Estonians
suffered during the years of Soviet occupation. Thereby, non-Estonians,
and particularly Russians, are often explicitly identified as tools of that
occupation. The non-Estonian side does not discuss history, rejects all
accusations that assume their collective guilt as former occupants and
criticises the opponents for not adhering to the international standards of
individual human rights and the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
While the Estonians underline the importance of learning the Estonian
language in the process of acquiring citizenship, the non-Estonian side calls
for lower language requirements for citizenship applicants, advocates
double citizenship for ethnic Russians and an official status for the Russian
language in Estonia.
In parallel to the debate on citizenship, the process of naturalization has
brought new members to Estonian citizenry. It is estimated that at the end of
1998 among Estonia’s current population almost 80 per cent held Estonian
citizenship, 13 per cent (mostly Russian-speakers) were stateless persons,
whereas some seven per cent were citizens of other states, mainly of Russia
(http://www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/1999/02cits.html). This means that among
the citizens of Estonia there are about 205,000 of those who are not ethnic
Estonians, which represent 18 per cent of all Estonian citizens.
Approximately half of them have acquired citizenship through
naturalization. This shows that naturalization has achieved certain progress.
9At the same time, the Estonian citizenship policy has produced some
questionable side-effects. First, almost 100,000 residents of Estonia have
become citizens of foreign states (mostly of Russia), which can be
considered as a potentially destabilizing factor and a security risk. Second,
nearly 200,000 people are still stateless. Large numbers of non-citizens
render the political cohesion of Estonian society problematical while their
non-participation in the political process on a national level has called the
nature of democracy in Estonia into question. This means that inclusion of
minority members into the society through national integration remains an
important issue for Estonia’s political stability, representative democracy,
and preparation for accession to the EU.
Until the restoration of Estonia's statehood in 1991, Russians felt they were
the majority in Estonia, as they were - though by a narrow margin - in the
Soviet Union. Estonians felt that they were a small minority of the Soviet
Union. In 1991 the roles were reversed. The mutual, painful process of
learning new roles is not yet finished. It is quite complicated for the
Russian-speakers since they have to adapt to the situation where the
Russian language no longer opens all doors. Instead, they have to learn the
local language and strive to integrate. Notwithstanding these challenges, an
overwhelming majority of Russians intend to stay in Estonia. Integration
will probably prove a serious test for Estonians as well, for it presupposes
their readiness, goodwill, and ability to overcome the traumatic experience
of the totalitarian past.
Estonia's political elite in its overwhelming majority is striving to make the
country a full-fledged member of the European Union. However, in their
attempts to meet the requirements for such membership, Estonian decision-
makers must, among other requirements, take into account the European
Commission's opinion on the issue of the Russian-speaking population
residing in Estonia. When discussing the political criteria for membership
of Estonia the Commission stated clearly in its Opinion on Estonia's
Application for Membership of the European Union that Estonia needs to
take measures to accelerate naturalization procedures to enable the
Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better integrated into Estonian
society. Responding to that challenge, the Estonian Government adopted in
February 1998 a policy paper Th  Integration of Non-Estonians into
Estonian Society. The bases of Estonia's national integration policy (see
Appendix). The main goal of the seminar was to discuss the problems of
implementation of these national integration policy guidelines adopted by
the Estonian Government.
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Introduction of the Seminar
The Seminar was opened by Dr Stefan Troebst, Director of the ECMI, in
the historical Kompagnietor Buiding, which the city of Flensburg has
provided for the ECMI. Dr Troebst welcomed the participants, calling them
a remarkable group of highly qualified experts on Estonia. He stressed that
Minister Veidemann had played a crucial role in producing the policy paper
of the Estonian Government on national integration. He added that
Ambassador Jüri Kahn’s previous post was in Moscow, while Ambassador
Detlof von Berg is currently the Head of the OSCE Mission to Estonia. Dr.
Klara Hallik served as Estonian minister of interethnic relations when the
restoration of Estonian statehood had just started. She, along with Mr
Aleksander Dushman, Mr Aleksei Semjonov and Mr Sergei Ivanov, MP,
all participants of this seminar, is a member of the Estonian Presidential
Roundtable on National Minorities. Mr Tiit Käbin is the Chairman of the
Constitutional Committee of the Estonian Parliament. Professor Marju
Lauristin has been appointed by the Council of Europe as a Member of the
Advisory Committee (under the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities). Dr Troebst pointed out that the seminar was
designed to facilitate the discussion on Estonian national integration taking
place in Estonia and beyond. This topic has become more important after
Estonia started the process of joining the EU. As evaluated by the European
Commission in Agenda 2000, “there are no major problems over respect
for fundamental rights [in Estonia]. But Estonia needs to take measures to
accelerate naturalisation procedures to enable the Russian-speaking non-
citizens to become better integrated into Estonian society.” In February
1998 the Government of Estonia adopted a policy paper on national
integration. By its constructive future orientation this document can be
regarded, said Dr Troebst, as a new step in the complex situation in which
Estonia found itself demographically and politically after 1991. However,
much too often it is extremely difficult to transform even the most carefully
considered principles, rules, laws and various other norms into practical
improvements. That is why the implementation of Estonian national
integration policy might also turn out to be a difficult and time consuming
enterprise. The reason that the ECMI has organized this seminar was so
that those professionally involved in the implementation process could
meet and contribute to the success of national integration in Estonia by
scrutinizing the main problems of this process. Dr Troebst concluded his
introduction by expressing a wish that the seminar would help the
participants achieve a better understanding of the complex problems of
national integration in Estonia and would contribute to the success of this
process.
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Two societies
(language communities)
in one state
“…ius sanguinis remains
the basis of Estonian
citizenship policy…”
The Estonian government's integration strategy
In autumn/winter 1997/98 the Estonian government started developing a
strategy for tackling the issue of integration. As a first step a policy paper
The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society. The bases of
Estonia's national integration policy was drafted within four months by a
commission of 18 persons under the responsibility of the Minister of
Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Estonia, Mrs. Andra Veidemann.
On 10 February 1998 the Estonian government adopted the policy paper
(see the text of it in the Appendix).
The first working session of the seminar started with a comprehensive
introduction of the policy paper to the audience by Minister Veidemann.
According to her, the paper is meant to give the Estonian national
integration policy a new and clear perspective. It reflects that times have
changed since 1991, the year in which Estonia had regained its
independence. The Minister emphasized that nowadays the majority of
non-Estonians living in the country accept the existence of an independent
Estonian state. The attitudes of the Estonians
have also developed; they are now much more
tolerant to the integration of non-Estonians into
Estonian society than just a few years ago. Both
developments taken together make integration possible. However, progress
in integration of non-Estonians has not only become a possibility but a
necessity as well. Integration has to be achieved to counter an unfavourable
tendency which can be observed in present day Estonia: the development of
two separated societies (language communities) in one state. Bold steps
have to be taken to alter this situation.
The Minister stressed that there is a consensus on the need for a respective
policy of integration, however, not on how this policy should be designed.
The adopted policy paper only lays down the
overall political context. It is meant to provide
guidelines for discussion inside and outside of
the government on a national integration policy,
finally resulting in the development of a respective programme, or action
plan. What, however, is not in question is that Estonian citizenship policy
remains conceptually based on iussanguinis. The population of Estonian
origin, the Minister argued, is too small (slightly below one million) for
keeping its culture and identity alive if a ius solis approach were adopted.
Further, Estonia can not accept the concept of two official languages (even
though Estonian society is multicultural). The Estonian people survived
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Integration for participation,
or integration through
participation
without statehood over centuries only due to its culture and language; they
have to be preserved unbiased. Therefore, the Estonian language has to be
regarded as the one and only state language. This means that the core
element of integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society has to be
learning the Estonian language, which will enhance their chances to
participate fully and actively in societal life. This is especially true with
respect to children and for that purpose the Russian-language schools have
to be remodelled.
Minister Veidemann's view of the integration of non-Estonians into
Estonian society was challenged by Aleksei Semjonov, Director of the
Human Rights Legal Information Centre in Tallinn. He explicitly
welcomed the policy paper and acknowledged it as a good first step.
Nevertheless, he still regarded the approach as insufficient. A gesture of
goodwill is not enough to achieve integration, he stated. S mjonov
expressed his astonishment at the fact that not a single member of the
Presidential Roundtable, which was explicitly established in order to
facilitate the dialogue between Estonian majority and non-Estonian
minority, had been invited to participate in the commission which drafted
the policy paper. He pointed out the aspects that he regarded important for
successful integration but which are missing in the policy paper, such as
representation of non-citizens in local government or the linguistic rights of
minorities. Essentially the paper, in Semjonov's understanding, lacks a
human rights approach even though human rights have to provide the basic
orientation for an acceptable integration policy. This becomes most
obvious in the fact that the paper, although entitled “bases of integration
policy”, excludes from its scope what in fact is currently the strongest
barrier against integration into the Estonian
society: the restrictive handling of the
citizenship issue. The paper follows a logic
of “integration for participation” and
indirectly declares the huge majority of non-Estonian permanent residents
as not yet being mature enough for enjoying the complete set of civil rights.
However, to ask the members of a disenfranchised minority first to
integrate with the majority and only then (perhaps) to grant them the right
to participate fully in political, societal and economic affairs, contradicts
the right to a nationality, which belongs to the group of basic human rights
according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international human rights documents. If one really wants to motivate
stateless non-Estonians residing in Estonia to integrate into Estonian
society and to identify with the Estonian state, the first step has to be
granting them citizenship. This would then base integration policy on a
logic of “integration through participation”.
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No consensus on
integration in social
science theory
However, the respective policy paper only allowed the conclusion that the
Estonian government saw no reason for changing anything in its present
citizenship policies. This perception was neither agreed upon by
international experts nor would it help to speed up the process of
integration. Under the present conditions 63 per cent of non-citizens do not
regard achieving citizenship as feasible. Pessimism, alienation and
orientation towards Russia, not by choice but by need, is growing among
this group contrary to the interests of all parties concerned.
Semjonov recited a long list of important international conventions dealing
with various aspects of civil, human and minority rights that Estonia has
neither signed nor ratified. Although he acknowledged that Estonia has
ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the restrictive
interpretation of the term minority by the Parliament: it includes only
citizens of Estonia. Semjonov argued that the norm of non-discrimination
of minorities in international law is binding also for Estonia and it is valid
for non-citizens as well. Estonian legislation, he concluded, does not
facilitate integration. If Estonian politics and society really want to have
integration, many existing laws have to be reconsidered and mass
statelessness has to be overcome.
The third introductory presentation was given by Pål Kolstø, Professor of
Oslo University. He discussed the issue of integration/assimilation and
diversity/homogeneity of minority/majority societies by sketching various
Western social science theories and normative models on the relationship
between cultural diversity, stability and democracy. Does cultural diversity
of the society and stability of the state fit together and under which
conditions? In search for an answer to this question Professor Kolstø
referred to the respective research work and
theoretical reasoning especially of Leo Kup r,
Arend Lijphart, Ian Lustick, Graham Smith,
Walker Connor, Ernest Gellner and David Laitin.
Kolstø impressively demonstrated that the answer in the discourse remains
ambiguous as no consensus has been reached on it. All respective political
positions, may they opt for integration/diversity or
assimilation/homogeneity, or may they track ideas of consociationalism,
ethnic democracy, domination or plural democracy, can find their
arguments in the debate. Therefore, Kolstø warned against taking the
present state of research as the final word. According to the findings of
David Laitin one may assume that Russian-speakers in Estonia in the
course of some generations will at any rate become not only integrated
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Baltic tensions have
a negative influence
on democratic
forces in Russia
bilingual speakers, but perhaps even assimilated monolingual Estonian
speakers. This process will originate from the individual minority members
calculating their economic interests and career strategies, and could be only
slowed down, but not stopped, by attempts of the Estonian authorities and
of the members of the Estonian society to prevent it. The pace of
integration of the non-Estonians may depend more on the success of
economic policy of the Estonian government than on its deliberate effort to
foster or impede the process.
The presentations by Minister Veidemann, Director Semjonov and
Professor Kolstø were followed by a general discussion. Not surprisingly,
the debate was as lively as it was controversial. Minister Veidemann
explicitly contradicted the presentation of Mr. Semjonov. She pointed to
the fact that the Council of Europe had ended monitoring of Estonia's
human rights policies. In her opinion this indicates that the Council of
Europe is satisfied with the development. Further, she matched Semjonov's
list of human rights instruments, which Estonia has not signed yet, by an
even longer list of respective documents that Estonia has signed and
ratified. Last, but not least, the Minister once again insisted on the
legitimacy of a citizenship policy based on the ius sanguinis, adding that to
be a citizen of a state is in the first place a responsibility, not a privilege
granted to him. However, one cannot take the responsibility if one is not
integrated and has insufficient command of the state language.
Interventions by some other Estonian participants supported the present
Estonian citizenship and minority policy not by discussing it in terms of
human rights standards, but by justifying it as a reaction to the Soviet past.
It must be acknowledged that it is only since three
or four years that Estonia has been living without
foreign troops on its territory and that daily Russian
pressure has to be taken into account. Nevertheless,
it was emphasized that all parties are looking for new solutions. A Russian
participant remarked that tensions in Estonia (and Latvia) are negatively
influencing the democratic forces in Russia by playing arguments into the
hands of the nationalists. She regarded it as important to provide better
information on what is going on in the Baltic States to the political elite in
Moscow as well as to the Russian media.
Already in this initial phase of the seminar two main controversies became
obvious, which remained valid throughout the following presentations and
discussions until the end of the seminar. The first controversy may be
characterized by Semjonov's terminology of “integration through
participation vs. integration for participation”, i.e. the question about
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whether or not attempts to reduce radically the existing mass statelessness
ought to be regarded as a relevant element in any honest strategy for
integrating non-Estonians into Estonian society. The second controversy
may be characterized by the catchword “language policy”; it challenged the
predominant Estonian understanding of integration as “lear ing the
Estonian language”. The dispute focused on the question of how the
knowledge of the Estonian language among Russian-speaking residents
may be spread without harming their right to their minority language, or -
as it was put in the discussions - without implementing an integration
strategy in a way that makes it in fact a strategy of assimilation, an
approach for which international law on the protection of minorities does
not allow.
16
Old attitudes and
new curricula
Compulsory Estonian
from the 2nd grade
The role of the educational system
The next two contributions focused on the role of education in the
integration process. It started with Mrs. Marju Lauristin, Professor of
Tartu University, who reported on two sociological research projects
describing the change of basic values among Estonians and non-Estonians
and on cultural attitudes of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia. A relatively
speedy change from collectivist to individualist attitudes, especially among
young Russians in Estonia, was observed. The pace of change among the
elderly generation was slower. This constitutes a
situation where in the families the old orientations
and attitudes are preserved, while at the same time
school education already is under revision and new curricula are being
introduced. However, Russian-language schools (the schools in which the
language of instruction is Russian) as compared to Estonian-language
schools are lagging behind in this process due to the fact that the latter
already in the Soviet past experienced more internal freedom. The main
necessities are changes in school, a re-education, to avoid a development of
separation: two language communities are living in two different mental
environments creating the danger of ghett ization of the minority and
marginalization especially of the younger generation of Russian-speakers.
The system of education and the media play a key role in avoiding such a
development.
Lauristin's more general considerations were complemented by a detailed
report on the curriculum reform in Russian-language schools, presented by
Mr. Meelis Kond, Head of the Department of Primary and Secondary
Education Inspectorate, Estonian Ministry of Education. One of the first
priorities of educational reform after 1991 was the
unification of the Estonian-language school system
and the Russian-language school system. In a first
step schooling was brought to the same duration (Russian-medium schools
from 10 to 12 years, Estonian-language schools from 11 to 12 years).
Further, a curriculum reform was introduced which in case of the Russian-
language schools attempts also to increase the number of Estonian lessons
and to introduce Estonian subjects such as Estonian literature and history.
Instruction in Estonian as a Second Language is compulsory from the 2nd
grade, however, may begin already in kindergarten provided qualified
teachers are available. The new curriculum will be implemented in
Russian-language schools from the 1998/99 school year on. Teaching some
subjects in Estonian language will gradually become compulsory. In line
with the amendment to the Law on Basic and Upper-secondary Schools, as
it was recently adopted by Parliament, at latest in the year 2007 it has to be
17
Teacher training
most urgent
English instead
of Estonian?
guaranteed that all graduates of Russian-language basic school
(compulsory school education of nine years) have reached a level of
Estonian language skills which will enable them to continue their studies in
Estonian language only. Beginning at latest in the 2007/08 school year
Estonian shall be the language of instruction in upper-secondary schools,
and from all teachers in all schools a high level of proficiency in Estonian
will be required. To achieve these aims, a plan of action for the
development of Russian-language schools has recently been published by
the Ministry of Education.
The presentations by Professor Lauristin and Mr. Kond were followed by a
discussion. A member of the Russian community in Estonia emphasized
that a curriculum reform might not change very much as long as better
training for the teachers is not provided. Especially, the professional skills
of teachers at Russian language schools were said to be quite poor and the
most urgent need would be to train them instead of just calling for them to
teach new contents. Further, the priority given to extended language
training in school was challenged by the assessment that it might be much
more urgent to concentrate the limited resources on the improvement of the
system of professional training instead as this would
give the Russian-speaking youth a much better
chance to find a job and to avoid getting
marginalized. A Western expert articulated worries that especially in the
north-eastern districts of Estonia not only marginalization is the danger,
but, even worse, separation may develop. A Latvian participant expressed
some doubts whether the line between more or less internal space of
manoeuvre for the schools in Soviet time really can be drawn along the
distinction between Russian-language schools on the one side and Estonian
(respectively Latvian) language schools on the other side.
A German participant referred to what in Germany is at present becoming
more and more obvious, namely that the foreign language competencies of
the average pupil are insufficient compared to what the ongoing process of
European integration requires. With this as
background, the question was raised whether it would
be more future-oriented and more beneficial for the
affected young people, as well as for the Estonian society in general, to use
the chance of a curriculum reform at the threshold of the EU for
“internationalizing” instead of “nationalizing” children by extending
second language training in English instead of Estonian. The idea was
immediately and decisively rejected by representatives of the Estonian
majority as it would end up in accepting a stable Estonian/Russian bilingual
society. It was argued that such approach would not serve the aim of
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national integration and of reducing the unemployment among Russian-
speaking youth. The increasing use of Estonian as the language of
instruction also in Russian-language schools has nothing to do with
eliminating these schools, it was argued, but is aimed at the stan ardization
of the school system for the sake of providing all children, Estonian and
non-Estonian, equal opportunities in the society in general and in the labour
market in particular.
However, in the increasingly heated debate several speakers blamed the
official Estonian language policy for artificially producing those problems
it afterwards pretends to solve. Equal opportunities would exist if
restrictive language laws were not discriminating against Russian-speakers
in various segments of the labour market. The higher unemployment rate
among young non-Estonians as compared to Estonians was regarded as a
product of the present language policy. If one is serious about integration
and better job opportunities for Russian-speakers, the best to do would be
to liberalize the language laws currently in force. Such demands were
strictly opposed by the proponents of the Estonian majority in Estonia. The
debate made quite clear that “integration” in their understanding means in
the first place “speaking Estonian” and accepting it as the only official
language in Estonia.
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Ethnic ‘other’ in
newspapers
The role of the media
While Mrs. Lauristin and Mr. Kond focused on the role of school education
and language training for the integration of the non-Estonian youth, the
media were in the centre of the next two contributions by Mr. Raivo Vetik
and Mr. Aleksandr Shegedin.
Raivo Vetik, Director of the Institute of International and Social Studies in
Tallinn, presented preliminary results from an ongoing research project on
the construction of an ethnic 'other' in Estonian news media. The research is
based on a theoretical model of semiotic character. Vetik st ongly
advocated the usefulness of a semiotic approach to the study of ethnic
conflict. This focuses on 'subjective' interpretations of the objectives and
behaviour of the ethnic 'other' in inter-ethnic relationships instead of being
dependent on any political, historical and socio-economic 'objectivity' of
the conflict. The latter does not, as Vetik pointed out, operate in an
unmediated form but through 'subjective' interpretations of the respective
groups. Perceptions of the actions and objectives of the ethnic 'other' are
often an independent and important factor in the structure of conflict.
Subjective interpretations construct reality. Therefore,
in an ethnic conflict not only one reality and only one
discourse are present but multiple realities and
divergent discourses exist. The research instrument distinguishes between
three semiotic types of 'self-other' relationship: the 'other' is perceived
either as a non-group (separation), an alien group (confrontation) or a
different group (integration). Based on the respective model a content
analysis of two leading Estonian newspapers, the one published in Estonian
and the other in Russian, was conducted for the period 1988 to 1996. The
data indicate a reversal in the types of construction of ethnic orientations in
Estonian media in 1996 compared to those in 1988. In 1996 the Estonian
language newspaper predominantly presented both the Estonians and the
Russians as being oriented towards integration with each other, while in the
Russian language newspaper both groups were characterized by a mode of
confrontation and separation. In 1988 it was vice versa: separation was the
preferential perception on the Estonian side and an ntegratio ist perception
dominated on the Russian side. Vetik regarded the results to be an
indication for the success of the strategy not to grant initial citizenship to
the immigrants who arrived during the Soviet period: such strategy had put
in place the 'non-group' model of inter-ethnic relations (separation) which
in turn prevented Estonia from an inter-ethnic clash.
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“Policy paper
overlooks media”
In his presentation Mr. Vetik also applied the semiotic approach to the
seminar itself. He reconstructed the dispute in the seminar on the Estonian
integration policy as in fact being a matter of two different discourses
based on a different understanding of integration and representing different
interests. These differences themselves have to be discussed more
intensively, not only the subject itself, the integration strategy. Indeed,
what the proponents of the government's position point at consists up to
now mainly of words, but they are important as words structure reality. On
the other hand, the proponents of the human rights position talk about a
reality, however, a reality which has been absent since some three years.
Therefore, their structuring of the present reality ends up in painting all in
black.
The development and present situation of the Russian-language media in
Estonia was the topic of the presentation given by Mr. Aleksandr
Shegedin, political observer of the Russian-language daily newspaper
Estoniya. He welcomed the government's outline of an integration strategy,
however, criticised that it completely fails to touch upon the media and
their high importance for the process of integration. To overcome
widespread mutual stereotypes and mistrust between
Estonians and non-Estonians, it is insufficient to
dedicate the whole programme only to the learning of
the Estonian language and the educational system. It is equally necessary to
strengthen the role of the media. How this could take place with respect to
the Russian-language media was the object of various proposals by Mr.
Shegedin. Some of them were:
· A countrywide Russian-language television channel ought to be
established. Television is the most influential mass-media, but the
present structure of television broadcasting with only very few and
qualitatively bad Russian-language programmes is working not for, but
against integration of non-Estonians. They simply watch television
channels from Russia and, therefore, are often better informed on
internal affairs of Russia than of Estonia.
· The informational quality of radio broadcasting in Russian language has
to be improved. This could best be done by establishing a second
respective radio channel in competition to the existing one (Radio 4).
· In line with the practice in most EU countries, minority language
newspapers, especially Russian-language local newspapers in north-
eastern Estonia, should be financially supported, to compensate for their
loss in sales due to the below average economic situation of their
constituency. Also bilingualism of newspapers should be encouraged by
financial support (as in Spain) and by introducing a programme of
exchange of journalists between Estonian and Russian-language media.
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· No Russian-language professional training institution for journalism
exists in Estonia. This should be changed immediately to avoid having to
send young journalists to Russia for professional training as is the case at
present.
In the following discussion Minister Veidemann responded to the critique
that the integration strategy leaves out the media by informing the audience
about a concrete action plan regarding media that is under consideration in
the government (however, no specifics were disclosed). The main issue for
the further debate was Shegedin's demand to give public support to the
Russian-language media. His call was backed by some speakers, opposed
by others. Support by the state would equal an under-the-hand re-
nationalization. The Russian newspapers should rationa ize by mergers.
The problem they have is a matter of lacking entrepreneurship, not of
lacking subsidies. It was suggested that Russians in general have to learn to
act more entrepreneur-like. With respect to Sh gedin's reference to the
existence of specific support schemes for minority media in many
European countries an Estonian participant reacted briefly but typically by
stating: “This will never happen in Estonia.” Further statements dealt with
a legally secure status, i.e. citizenship, as a need for good entrepreneurship,
with many Russian residents reading Estonian newspapers, while the
opposite is not happening, and with foreign capital in Estonia engaging in
the media of the majority, however not in that of the minority.
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Privatization
and ethnic
dividing lines
The task of integration
of 100 nationalities
Politics of integration
Dr. Erik Andre Andersen from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
(COPRI), Denmark, presented the results of his research on the
consequences of privatization for the Russian population in Estonia. He
came to the conclusion that all five privatization programmes investigated
by him favoured the Estonians as compared to the Russians, regardless
whether the legislation or the outcome in terms of statistical data is
analyzed (the latter showing an even more clear differentiation). As a result
of the privatization process a number of economic and social dividing lines,
which previously did not exist and now come close to the ethnic dividing
lines, were drawn up in Estonian society. This result was
not solely, but mainly caused by the Estonian ethnic
policies of the years up to 1995. It was not an accidental
result, but deliberately arranged by the ruling parties.
Starting in 1996 a certain change in Estonian minority politics took place.
Seemingly influenced by the international community and the desire of
Estonia to become a member of the EU, some improvements can be
observed, aiming more at integration than at the separation of the ethnic
groups. However, even if the Russian-speaking population can gain more
participatory influence and equal rights they are placed under a
socioeconomic handicap. The once-established ownership relations and the
unequal distribution of influential management positions will hardly
change. The free market forces will not by themselves diminish the existing
differences between the ethnic groups, but more probably aggravate them.
With this background it once again becomes important that at least
citizenship is granted to the Russian-speaking population if integration is
really desired. Otherwise political and socioeconomic tensions may
influence each other negatively and cause further separation and
marginalization of the Russian-speaking population, if not an escalation of
inter-ethnic conflict.
The attempts to manage the task of integration on the local and regional
level were the subject of a report by M . Aleksander Dushman, Main
Expert on Interethnic Relations of the Ida-Viru County Government. He
informed about the activities developed by the
authorities of Ida-Virumaa. In this county at the
Estonian-Russian border only 18 per cent of the
population are of ethnic Estonian origin while some 70 per cent are ethnic
Russians. Belarussians, Ukrainians, Finns and members of almost 100
other nationalities add up to the remaining more than 10 per cent of the
population. In fact, these small groups are larger as the available data show
because during Soviet times it was not opportune to belong to the smaller
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Regional Round
Table of cultural
organizations
Changes
towards less
ethnocentric
policy
nationalities. At any rate, the region is multi-national and multi-cultural and
it should remain this way also in the future. More than 20 national culture
societies are working as NGOs in the county. An integration process must
be accomplished by spreading knowledge of Estonian language and
culture, by developing the county economically, by preserving the national
cultures, restoring the national identities and studying
the respective mother tongues, and by organizing inter-
ethnic communication. For that reason, a Round Table
of National Cultural Organizations was established in
the county three years ago. In cooperation with the county government and
different national and international organizations and foundations,
conferences, supplements to the local newspaper, information material and
training seminars for teachers on different nationalities and their cultures,
as well as on the idea of multicultural society in general, were organized by
the Round Table. The next steps have to be a quick implementation of the
state programme for training Estonian language in a way appropriate for
the specific situation of Ida-Virumaa, the approval of the national Sunday
schools by the state and the local authorities, a more positive reporting on
the integration activities by the mass-media, and more support by state and
local authorities of the activities of the different national organizations.
The former Estonian Minister of Interethnic Relations, Dr. Klara Hallik,
pointed out in her presentation the complexity of the integration process, as
well as the heterogeneous perceptions and expectations it is confronted
with from the side of the majority and from the side of the minorities. On
the official level of Estonian politics a clear distinction is made between
integration and assimilation, however, it is beyond doubt that the
discussion continues about an Estonian-centred state and society. An
ethnocultural existentialism prevails. The aim of integration is to strengthen
the ethnic Estonian foundations of society. Mrs. Hallik nevertheless has
observed recent changes compared to a much clearer
ethnocentric policy cultivated seven years before.
Migrants from the Soviet period are now much more
often considered belonging to the Estonian society; anti-
Russian ethnocentrism has considerably diminished with
Estonia integrating more and more into the European structures.
Nevertheless, an analysis of programmes and documents of elections
campaigns of the Estonian-based political parties led Dr. Hal ik to the
conclusion that ethno-nationalism is still the ideology of the major Estonian
parties. None of the platforms show any plans to organize a political
dialogue with the non-Estonians on state matters. Dr. Hallik expressed her
hopes that the practical steps of the government towards more intensive
inclusion of non-Estonians into society and state-building will result in
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Legal equality is most
important for integration
some revision of the ideology of ethnic conservatism which so far is
characteristic of most of the Estonian political parties.
Mr. Sergei Ivanov, Member of the Estonian Parliament (Russian Faction
of the Riigikogu,) and Member of the Presidential Roundtable on
Minorities, once again welcomed the government's policy paper on national
integration. He saw in it a new qualitative attitude and a pragmatic
approach to the tasks ahead. He nevertheless regarded it as necessary that
more attention be given to the issues of citizenship and naturalization. A
clear legal relationship between the individual and the state as well as an
undeniable legal indication of equality are most important factors for
integration. It would provide what at present does not exist and which has
made the numerous language training programmes more expensive than
successful: motivation for studying the Estonian language. In addition,
easing and speeding up the na uralization process would stabilize not only
inter-ethnic relations but the Estonian state as
well. Mr. Ivanov regarded the current number
of foreigners and non-citizens residing in
Estonia as much too high for a small republic while at the same time the
naturalization process due to the high barriers is very slow. On this
background Mr. Ivanov suggested in the first place to amend the
Citizenship Law to grant citizenship to children born in Estonia to stateless
parents; to exempt elderly people, invalids, and persons who are married to
an Estonian citizen from the language and constitution examinations.
Further, Mr. Ivanov criticized the language exams needed for naturalization
as much too tough and too complicated. According to him the requirements
should be lowered.
Mr. Boris Tsilevich, Director of the Centre for Social and Educational
Research “Baltic Insight” and Member of the City Council of Riga, Latvia,
presented a comparison of minority-majority relations in Estonia and in
Latvia. In his opinion, the political and demographic legacy of the Soviet
period in these two countries is similar but not identical. For instance, the
percentage of titular ethnic group among the population is higher in
Estonia, whereas in Latvia Russians are geographically not separated from
the titular group so sharply as they are in Estonia. The share of non-titular
pre-war citizens in today’s population is also different. In Estonia this share
is less than 10 per cent while in Latvia it is 22 per cent. Moreover,
according to the data of the 1989 census, 21 per cent of Russians then
living in Latvia and 14 per cent in Estonia claimed fluency in the
corresponding titular language. In Latvia, the level of ethnically mixed
marriages has been traditionally higher than in Estonia. All this brought
Tsilevich to the conclusion that at the moment of the restoration of
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Dissimilar decisions
on minority issues
taken in Estonia and
Latvia
independence the level of separation – in geographic, linguistic, and social
terms - between the titular ethnic group and the Russian-speakers was
substantially lower in Latvia than in Estonia.
Given these differences, quite dissimilar political decisions on minority
issues were taken in Estonia and Latvia. Although both countries decided
to restore pre-war citizenship and introduced naturalization procedures,
naturalization in Latvia started only in February 1995 – almost three years
later than in Estonia. Again, the initial version of the Estonian citizenship
law established much less stringent naturalization criteria than the Latvian
one. On the other hand, the legal status of non-
citizens in Latvia was defined in a more liberal
manner than in Estonia. While non-citizens in
Estonia were defined as foreigners who have to
apply for residence and work permits, in Latvia
their status was determined by a special law on former USSR citizens who
have neither Latvian nor other state’s citizenship. Though adopted as late as
in April 1995, this law guaranteed several important non-citizens’ rights.
At the same time, unlike Estonia, Latvia has institutionalized ethnicity by
mandatory record of ethnic origin in citizens’ and non-citizens’ passports.
Concerning participation in local elections, Estonia has granted permanent
resident non-citizens the right to vote. In Latvia, only citizens can vote at
the municipal level, which, to Tsilevich, seems to provoke further
exclusion among Latvia’s non-citizens rather than help to integrate them.
Estonia’s non-citizens are much more active both in terms of naturalization
and acquiring Russia’s citizenship. More than half of the initial number of
de facto stateless persons have already obtained some citizenship. In
Latvia, Tsilevich estimated, this process is very slow.
In Estonia, political activity of the Russian minority follows ethnic lines. In
1995 the Russian electoral list won seats in the Estonian parliament. In
Latvia, parties explicitly based on ethnic (Russian) criteria never enjoyed
support on the part of the Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia. In both the
1993 and 1995 elections “The Russian list” failed to receive representation
in the Latvian parliament. In Tsilevich’s opinion, the Estonian authorities
have proved to be much more instrumental in setting up a formal dialogue
with the Russian minority than have their Latvian colleagues. The
Representative Assembly elected by several Russian NGOs w s officially
registered in Estonia while a similar body established by the Latvian non-
citizens – the League of Stateless Persons – was denied registration.
Estonian President’s Roundtable on Minorities, established in 1993,
appeared an effective tool for discussing urgent issues relevant to inter-
26
Did Estonian
politics follow ethnic
considerations?
ethnic interaction and cooperation, while analogous body in Latvia – the
Presidential Nationalities Consultative Council established in 1996 –has
not yet arrived at an efficient format of its activities.
Tsilevich explained more flexible policies implemented by the Estonian
authorities, such as readiness for dialogue and occasional concessions, by
the concentration of the Russian-speaking non-citizen population in Ida-
Virumaa region bordering with the Russian Federation, which makes the
emergence of separatist and secessionist ideas more real than in Latvia
where no such threat exists. Nevertheless, both Estonia and Latvia,
according to Tsilevich, still face very serious problems regarding the
majority-minority relations and the integration of their societies. However,
it seems to him that Estonia is a couple of steps closer to the resolution of
these problems than is Latvia.
In the discussion following the aforementioned presentations a debate on
terminology and its political implications was triggered off. Dr. Andersen
was criticized by a member of the Estonian majority for using the terms
‘Russians’ and ‘Russian-speakers’ in his analysis of the privatization
process and thereby giving the false impression that there had been an anti-
Russian stance in the process and ethnic discrimination had taken place. It
was claimed that Estonian politics never followed any ethnic
considerations, but only the requirements of the restitution of the Estonian
state and its independence. Affected by this were non-Estonian migrants,
many of them neither of Russian ethnicity nor of Russian mother-tongue. It
was also claimed that Russians do not constitute a specific problem for
Estonian politics, which is about the broad
spectrum of non-Estonians residing in the country.
This view was opposed by some western
participants as well as representatives of the
Russian minority in Estonia. The emphasis on the many other nationalities
with small or tiny communities in Estonia serves the purpose of
camouflage and of providing legitimization for not accepting the Russians
to enjoy their full rights as a national minority. If only the small groups
were existing, there would be no problems. The large Russian community
is politically not welcomed. Therefore, it is argued that any support for the
Russian community would be a discrimination against the small groups.
The ‘non-Estonians’ are talked about, but Russians and Russian-speakers
(those with Russian as their first language) are meant.
However, the discussion also touched other aspects of the presentations. It
was mentioned that in the privatization of flats a policy change has taken
place towards recognition of the interests of the non-Estonians. Information
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The EU has positive
impact on Estonian
national integration
was given about the existence of an ECOS-Overture programme, which
encourages the foundation of small and medium enterprises in Ida-Vi umaa
also by Russian residents. It was remarked that everybody talks about the
problems of minorities but no one deals with the problems of majorities. It
was pointed out that integration has to be understood as a two-way road, on
which not only the minorities but also the majorities have to move. It was
denied that the requirements for successfully passing the language exams
are too high, however, it was agreed that the org nization of the tests might
be not so good and should be reformed.
An expert from Western Europe working in Estonia articulated his
impression that a basic problem has to be seen in the fact that many
Russians have never learnt to learn foreign languages. It was assessed by an
Estonian Russian that despite all measures taken by the Estonian authorities
the language situation will not change very much
throughout the next years; Estonia will continue
to be in fact bilingual. An Estonian researcher and
a colleague of her from a Western European
country agreed that the beginning of negotiations on the accession of
Estonia to the EU had a positive impact on the Estonians' readiness to
accept the integration of Russians into Estonian society. It was stressed by
an Estonian expert that the Russian residents have in fact to manage not
only integration into the Estonian society, but at the same time also
integration into the EU (which they are more in favour of than the
Estonians are), and finally into their own culture in Russia.
Last but not least, a German participant em hasized that the problem how
to achieve integration without harming the rights and the identity of
minorities is not only a problem for Estonia. In Germany, for instance, non-
Germans permanently residing in the country make up some 10 per cent of
the total population and at present nearly two million German citizens have
Russian as their mother-tongue. Asked by an Estonian politician how the
situation is dealt with in Germany the answer was: “We are only near to the
very first step and that is to honestly accept for oneself that one has a
problem, but not yet a convincing and consensual solution for it.”
28
International and
Estonian approaches
to integration
International standards and decision-making on the EU
Three contributions discussed the Estonian integration policy and majority-
minority relations from the point of view of the provisions, standards and
recommendations for the protection and integration of minorities
established by the international community.
Dr. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, Senior Researcher at the Sc leswig-
Holstein Institute for Peace Research (SHIP) in Kiel, Germany, presented a
comparative analysis of the Estonian government's policy paper on national
integration. She first outlined the understanding of the concept of
‘integration’ as it is expressed in the recommendations to the Estonian
government made by international governmental organizations in several
fact-finding reports and other documents on the citizenship issue in
Estonia. This international approach to integration was then compared with
the Estonian government's concept of national
integration as far as it can be drawn from the
respective policy paper. The understanding in
both concepts of the actors involved, of the aims
and the processes of integration as well as of the actions and means for
achieving integration were discussed. Dr. Birckenbach concluded that both
concepts show many similarities. However, a closer look at the matter
makes visible also essential differences. The government's concept is based
on ethnic priorities of nation-building (‘non-Estonians’ as the target group)
rather than republican considerations on which the international
recommendations are based on (‘non-citizens’ as the target group). The
latter focuses on reforming the legal and political system, whereas the
government paper puts the burden on the educational system, which is the
weakest and most overestimated element for causing social change as
experience in many societies has proved. The government's paper left on
Dr. Birckenbach the impression that its authors apparently wanted to solve
a dilemma: clear the way for international integration of Estonia through
EU membership and at the same time achieve ethnically based nation-
building. Therefore, the proposed strategy is more of a symbolic nature and
lacks credibility if one considers the means and actions proposed. Despite
such a critical view with respect to some important aspects of the policy
paper, Dr. Birckenbach explicitly acknowledged that it picked up on some
of the international concerns and that the existence of the paper in itself
might help to initiate a public debate on how to end the exclusion of a
relevant share of Estonian residents from politics and society in Estonia.
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Attitudes in
international law
towards citizenship
are changing
Dr. Maria Lundberg, Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of Human
Rights in Oslo, reviewed developments in international law important for
the Estonian case. She stressed that the formulation of internationally
binding standards is a continuous process. For some years this process has
gone in a direction to make citizenship less a requirement for enjoying
minority rights. The latter are increasingly understood as being part of the
human rights catalogue, and human rights are valid under all conditions,
regardless of citizenship. To read international law on minority rights still
in a way that its high standards have to be applied only to the so-called
national minorities, but not to non-citizens, ignores the dynamics inherent
in the international standard setting process, the Norwegian expert
explained. Further, it has to be understood that the European Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is oriented to the
preservation of minorities, their language and culture, but not to their
integration.
The issue of whether the minority rights, codified in public international
law, require citizenship of the respective state for being applicable was
taken up also by Dr. Carmen Thiele, Assistant Professor at the chair of
public law, Europe University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, Germany. In her
view a distinction has to be made between the universal level (UN system)
and the European level. On the universal level, a clear tendency can be seen
to understand minority rights as human rights and not merely as civil rights.
However, in the European context, the situation is
more ambivalent. Both concepts are existing and
one has to wait and see whether the tendency
towards abolishing citizenship as a criterion for
defining national minorities will prevail. Further,
Dr. Thiele discussed the state of the art in international law with respect to
the right to a nationality. She identified a clear tendency to substitute the
classical view, that the granting of nationality lies solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state, by a modern, more human rights oriented
view. The presentation then focused on the Estonian citizenship law, asking
whether it conforms with public international law. With respect to some
provisions Dr. Thiele had boubts. Issues of concern were among others the
provisions on citizenship for children of stateless parents; the
differentiation made in the context of double citizenship which is allowed
to citizens by birth, but not to citizens by naturalization; the extent and
grade of difficulty of language knowledge required for naturalization
(Estonian laws require a level of language proficiency equalling higher
education while international law only requires a level of general
knowledge).
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Is international
community applying
double standards?
“To EU, or not to EU,
this is the question”
In the presentation by Mr. Tiit Käbin, Member of the Estonian Parliament
(Riigikogu) and Chairman of its Constitutional Committee, a very specific
aspect of Estonian development became topical: the interrelation between
inner-Estonian integration and the integration of Estonia into European
structures. He acknowledged that a Hamlet’s question “To EU, or not to
EU?” is already facing Estonia. However, before Estonia can join the EU,
Article 1 of the Estonian constitution, which proclaims that “Estonian
independence and sovereignty is interminable and inalienable”, has to be
changed. Its present wording does not allow Estonia to delegate any of its
sovereignty. Such change of the constitution can only happen by a lengthy
and time-consuming procedure of decision-
making, which might demand approval by two
subsequent parliaments and/or cumulate in a
referendum. At present it is unpredictable what the outcome of such a
referendum will be. It might be perceived as the EU membership
referendum rather than on the adjustment of the constitution. Many
Estonian citizens, even if in favour of EU membership, have reservations
against changing constitutional provisions about sovereignty, which were
included as a safeguard against being incorporated into something like the
Soviet Union once again. Other Estonians, due to their vested economic
interests, might have reservations of their own against the EU membership,
even though they do not reject constitutional change. Importantly, among
the Russian-origin population the EU membership enjoys more support
than among ethnic Estonians. However, many ethnic Russians at present
are not eligible to vote as they are not Estonian citizens. An improvement
of the internal inter-ethnic relations in Estonia and a reduction in number of
stateless people would therefore help Estonia's strive for EU membership to
gain majority among the Estonian constituency.
In the discussion representatives of the Estonian majority opposed the
presentations by Birckenbach, Lundberg and Thiele. The notion that
Estonia has problems with meeting internationally agreed standards was
rejected. In the course of this debate an issue which had been touched upon
already earlier in the seminar now became more topical: the question
whether the international community applies
double standards when criticising Estonia for not
being in line with all existing human rights and
minority rights standards. From a representative
of the majority in Estonia the question was raised whether the respective
conventions are fully applicable to the new democracies as they have to
tackle with other problems than the old, consolidated democracies. For
countries like Estonia development has to come first, human rights later.
Further, an impression was articulated that small states are accused by large
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All violations
of rights must
be criticized
ones for not doing enough to meet the international standards while the
large states ignore the same standards themselves. (“The big want to teach
the small without taking the lesson seriously themselves.”) For instance, an
Estonian participant pointed out that it is much easier for a Russian resident
in Estonia to gain Estonian citizenship than for a Turkish migrant in
Germany to get a German passport. Further, Germany would also not allow
double citizenship.
A participant from Western Europe countered that the Turks in Germany
and the Russian-speakers in Estonia are different cases as the Turks are not
stateless and they knew they were going abroad when they emigrated to
Germany. However, several Western European participants agreed without
reservations that double standards indeed exist. The fact is not tolerable and
has to be criticized wherever it occurs. Nevertheless, this fact does not
legitimize any violation of international law. Instead, any
deficiencies of national legislation with respect to human
rights and minority rights have to be subject to criticism,
regardless whether they occur in large or small states. To
criticize Estonia does not mean to view other states as fulfilling all
requirements of international human rights standards. Those people and
groups in Germany, for instance, who are struggling for new German
legislation on asylum seekers, foreigners and citizenship more in line with
international human rights standards, would surely appreciate any honest
Estonian support of their case. Instead, it seems that their criticism of
restrictive German legislation is misused in Estonia for legitimizing
restrictive Estonian legislation.
Further, a Russian participant from Estonia reminded that the Presidential
Roundtable on Minorities as well as the Advisory Board of the Minister for
Interethnic Relations had formulated recommendations with respect to the
citizenship issue which were in line with the international standards in the
course of the drafting of the policy paper on national integration. However,
they were ignored. An Estonian politician replied that all recommendations
had been carefully studied, but not all were adopted because then surely a
next list of recommendations would have been drafted. Finally, an Estonian
researcher remarked that more thought should be given to avoiding the
possibility that in the future Estonia might become subject to trade
sanctions by actors in the international environment due to its handling of
human and minority rights.
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Debate was more focused
on problem-solving than
before but heavy dispute
remains
Final Remarks by the General R pporteur
The seminar ended with remarks by its General Rapporteur, Dr. Christian
Wellmann, Deputy Director of the Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace
Research (SHIP), Kiel, Germany, who had followed the debate without
intervening. “We are at the end of a seminar, but at the beginning of a
process”, Dr. Wellmann stated. It is the process of drafting, adopting,
implementing, executing and evaluating a policy aiming at integrating
Estonian society, which in Dr. Wellmann's understanding includes all long-
term residents in Estonia, regardless of their ethnicity and present status.
The beginning of this process was marked by the adoption and
dissemination of the February 1998 policy paper and the seminar just
ending has to be regarded an important element in initiating dialogue and
cooperation necessary between all parties concerned to make integration in
Estonia become a success story.
The rapporteur’s impression of the seminar was that, compared to only
some two to three years ago, the quality of argumentation on all sides has
improved and the debate is more oriented to
problem-solving, instead of remaining
restricted to a mutual exchange of
accusations and to lengthy monologues of
self-centred legitimization. Emotions are
still running high (and why should they not?), but the fruitless debates of
former times on “who is guilty” have been widely replaced in this seminar
by a notion of constructive controversy on “how to settle the conflict”. The
rapporteur expressed his thanks to all participants for having contributed to
this progress.
Furthermore, the seminar made obvious again that the conflict over the
appropriate majority-minority relationship in Estonia is still far from being
settled. Heavy dispute remains. Nevertheless, it became clear in the
seminar that a fundamental consensus is existing which should be
recognized by all parties as a solid common ground for further joint efforts:
even those participants who articulated the strongest critique on the
integration strategy as outlined in the government's policy paper explicitly
admitted that the paper marks an important positive step. However, up to
now the paper is not much more than an programmatic idea, which still
waits
· to be convincingly backed by the Estonian Parliament,
· to be translated into a programme of action,
· to have considerable financial and political domestic resources allocated
to it, a step mainly to be taken again by the Parliament (waiting for the
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“Government should
be given credit, its
critics should be
regarded as allies”
international community to finance the programme of action will not be
enough).
As long as these steps have not been taken, it is perhaps a bit early to come
up with too much critique on the policy paper. First it has to be
substantiated more to see what it really contains. On the other hand, the
paper itself invites comments and a critical public should accompany all
political moves in any case. Indeed, observation of the further
developments is necessary because at any of the three steps mentioned, the
programme might fail to come alive or might be turned upside down by
depriving it of its present orientation and character. The dangers the
programme faces are,
· that its spirit and substance gets lost completely in the power play of
domestic politics,
· that it turns out to be an assimilation programme instead of an
integration programme,
· that it will be abused as a substitute for progress in citizenship politics
instead of amending and complementing it,
· that it will not be implemented accordingly but remains paper work used
as a camouflage against the EU and other international bodies calling for
improvement of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia (the integration
programme as the Estonian variant of Potjomkin's famous villages?).
As soon as any of such developments occurs on the horizon those who are
critically accompanying and backing the process have indeed to ring the
alarm bell, the rapporteur concluded. Until then,
he stated, the government should be given credit
and earn support for its move. On the other hand,
the government should accept that those groups
who regard the governmental approach to
integration as not reaching far enough are themselves committed to
integration and therefore should be treated as being allies in substance not
opponents. They have to be regarded as democratic watchdogs instead of
troublemakers. To allow them to take a constructive role the government
should make sure that the further development of the integration policy
happens with a maximum of transparency, which at any rate is the best
safeguard against being cr ticized unjustifiably on the grounds of a lack of
information. In order to make such recommendations feasible, the
rapporteur suggested that the Minister of Interethnic Relations establish at
its office a roundtable on integration policy as an institutionalized channel
for the articulation of suggestions as well as critical comments with respect
to the design and the implementation of the announced programme of
action. Finally, Dr. Wellmann addressed the seminar's various parties
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“The Estonian language
survived for centuries
without any Estonian
statehood protecting it!”
separately by sketching some thoughts they might consider on their return
home. For this purpose he distinguished three “parties”.
(1) The “party” representing the Estonian majority and the government's
position:
(a) It became obvious at the seminar what the main concern of this faction
in the conflict is: it is the preservation of the Estonian language which is
regarded as challenged by the Russian language. The rapporteur, however,
reminded of what Minister Veidemann said at the beginning of the seminar:
the Estonian language survived over centuries without any Estonian
statehood protecting it! With this background the proponents of the
Estonian language should think about
whether they could not relax a bit and take a
somewhat more liberal approach based on
self-confidence: If their language survived
centuries of domination by German,
Swedish and Russian rule why should it die under the conditions of
Estonian statehood, which protects the language much more even if some
elements of bilingualism exist?
(b) It became also obvious at the seminar that the traumas of history still
have a strong effect. This is quite understandable. However, those referring
to history should make themselves aware of the fact that meanwhile not
only one history exists (their history of Soviet rule), but a second history
started in Estonia in 1991 which may traumatize again, now the other
segment of residents in Estonia (the history of disenfranchisement of the
non-Estonians who immigrated throughout the Soviet period).
(2) The “party” representing the Estonian minority position including the
proponents of international law standards:
Human rights and minority rights have to be protected consequently, and
without bias. The rapporteur recalled the seminar's debate on the existence
of double standards. He articulated his impression that this issue is not
actively addressed by the “minority party” as it complicates its stance and
makes it necessary to think and to talk about more than only the Estonian
case. The issue is only dealt with in a defensive manner. Instead it should
be tackled offensively, not least because this would strengthen the
credibility of ones own position and it could help to make the domestic
controversy less accusing by indicating that Estonia is not simply lagging
behind but has the chance to gain an international reputation by choosing
the role of a forerunner of minority rights.
(3) The European Centre for Minority Issues as a “party”:
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Two follow-up
meetings proposed
The rapporteur expressed his and the participant's thanks to the ECMI for
having made this seminar possible in terms of finances but, not less
important, in terms of providing a neutral and protective frame for a frank
dialogue between conflicting positions. However, as the process has only
started and the integration programme itself still has to be drafted and
implemented the question arises how the process
can be accompanied by respective follow-up
activities and whether ECMI can again be
supportive. The rapporteur recommended to ECMI
to check whether it can take initiative for two follow-up meetings:
a) A smaller seminar, bringing together Estonian and international scholars
dealing with the integration issue;
b) A seminar of the same format as the present meeting, scheduled to be
held when the draft programme of action within the framework of the
Estonian strategy of integration has been published but is still open for
revisions and amendments.
The first follow-up meeting should facilitate a review of the results of
respective research work for the purpose of introducing its substance to the
consideration of the second meeting. This second meeting should continue
the dialogue from the present seminar, however on the more concrete and
more precise level possible as soon as the strategy of national integration of
non-Estonians starts to materialize. Minister Veidemann welcomed this
recommendation and declared her readiness to host the second follow-up
seminar, provided the ECMI decides to include this in its plans.
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Appendix*
                                                     
* The authors are grateful to Mrs Viive Aasma, Director of the Estonian Language
Strategy Centre, Tallinn, for providing ECMI with statistical materials which were
distributed among the participants of the seminar in May 1998 and are used in this
Appendix.
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Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society
The bases of Estonia’s national integration policy
(Adopted at the 10.02.1998 session of the Government of the Republic of Estonia)
1. Estonia’s current policy on non-Estonians and the legislation expressing
this policy evolved in a specific socio-political context characterised by
the restoration of the independence of Estonia and its emergence from
the sphere of influence of its eastern neighbour. (The definitions
muulane and mitte-eestlane are used as synonyms for non-Estonian i
the Estonian version of this text. Policy on non-Estonians means the
steps taken by the state which directly or indirectly influence the
position and opportunities of non-Estonians in Estonian society.) This
context determined the content and dominant approach of policy. Under
current legislation, the non-Estonian segment of society is divided into
four legal categories – Estonian citizens, citizens of other states, persons
with undetermined citizenship and undocumented persons.
2. By the beginning of 1998 the national and international situation has
changed. A mental shift has occurred among the majority of non-
Estonians, including the acceptance of Estonian independence as an
inevitable fact. Compared to the beginning of the 1990s, the approach of
Estonians on issues involving non-Estonians has also developed;
attitudes have become more tolerant and open.
New problems arising from the large non-Estonian segment of society
have entered the agenda. Nationally this involves, above all, the
alienation of an appreciable number of non-Estonians from Estonian
society and isolation in a world of their own language and mentality.
Sociological research conducted in the 1990s clearly points to the
development of a “two societies in one state” model in Estonia. It is not
difficult to see the danger of such development to both social and
security policy. The situation among non-Estonians youth is of concern,
where many talented young people cannot find sufficient employment
opportunities, while growing unemployment provides fertile ground for a
criminal subculture.
3. The changed internal and external situation requires that Estonia’s
policy on non-Estonians take a new step forward. This step must be
based on our current national and social interests, the goal of ensuing
rapid modernisation of society in the context of accession to the
European Union, while preserving both stability and commitment to the
protection and continued development of Estonian culture. The new step
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must mean the replacement of what until now has been largely
spontaneous development with a national strategy, which includes a
clear orientation to the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian
society. (Integration means the engagement of persons in all levels of
society. Integration is ot a change in ethnic identity, but the removal of
barriers, which hinder many non-Estonians from participating fully in
Estonian society.) This means the implementation of a national
programme directed at integration together with institutional and
financial support. Above all this will pertain a significant reduction in
the number of persons with undetermined citizenship, a substantial
breakthrough in teaching of the official language and real participation
of non-Estonians in Estonian society.
4. The emphasis of Estonia’s national policy on non-Estonians should be
as follows:
- orientation to the future. Policy on non-Estonians must be based not
so much on the problems of the past as on ensuring a stable future and
development potential for Estonia, the need to modernise, and the
values of a united Europe.
- emphasis on children and youth. The goal is that the generation
growing up in Estonia today will in the next century become citizens
who value the Estonian state and country and consider it their home.
Attention and tangible resources must be focused above all on nursery
schools, schools, hobby groups and summer camps.
- integration as a challenge for development for Estonians and non-
Estonians. Integration requires a serious effort on the part of non-
Estonians, since language skills and the resulting competitiveness do not
come on their own. At the same time it is a challenge to Estonians’
openness and democracy. If Estonians do not understand the need for
such development and are not prepared to take steps of their own, there
is no point in setting goals for integration. Without a doubt, integration
strategy is also a difficult task for the Estonian state and politicians
since domestic policy objectives for the development of Estonia as a
democratic nation state must be defined.
- active participation of non-Estonians in integration as real
contributors whose needs and expectations are addressed in the
formation of policy on non-Estonians. The distrust and passiveness
prevalent among non-Estonians must be replaced by the understanding
that each person’s potential for a secure future in Estonian society
depends on their own activeness and ability to co-operate.
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- confidence as the basis for integration. Barriers can actually be
removed and tolerance can develop only in a situation where all parties
feel confident and secure. For Estonians this means guarantees for the
preservation and development of Estonian customs, manners and ideals.
For non-Estonians this means the confidence that the policies of the
Estonian state are not directed at driving them out or their assimilation.
The model of two distinct societies increases the level of insecurity for
both Estonians and non-Estonians. Integration is the only way to
achieve a sense of confidence for both parties.
5. In order to implement a policy on non-Estonians, political consensus is
needed to create and launch a national programme. A national
integration programme should be prepared by March 1998 and
discussed both by political forces and the public so that it can be
implemented as a national development programme beginning in 1999.
The national programme must become the cornerstone of Estonia’s
policy on non-Estonians during the next ten years. The programme must
be based on the clear specification of goals of the state in this sphere.
The goals of the state in forming a policy on non-Estonians are:
- to change attitudes in addressing issues related to non-Estonians. The
attitude “non-Estonians as a problem” must be replaced by the attitude
“non-Estonians as participants in rebuilding Estonia”. The key issue
here is expression of the state’s interest and attitude toward the potential
of non-Estonians in Estonia, particularly of the new generation. Only a
clear expression of the interest of the state in issues related to non-
Estonians can create the political atmosphere necessary for true
integration, including readiness to participate among non-Estonians.
- significant reduction in the numbers of persons with undetermined
citizenship in the Republic of Estonia. The Estonian state is interested
in a population with a clearly defined legal status. We want that non-
Estonians in Estonia would be predominantly Estonian citizens. The
state is interested in making the naturalisation process more efficient
and in providing it with both political and material support. We must
promote the development of children born in Estonia into Estonian
citizens, regardless of nationality of their parents.
- development of the Estonian educational system to be the central
integration agent. The future model of the Russian-language school
must be clarified. Estonian-language schools also require the
preparation of teachers for work with a multilingual and multicultural
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student population and the creation of Estonia-centred textbooks and
teaching materials. The goal is that a youth who graduates from a non-
Estonian basic school will be proficient in the Estonian language and
that this will allow him or her, if desired, to become an Estonian citizen
without a further exam and he or she will not face linguistic or cultural
barriers to furthering education or competing in the labour market.
- rapid improvement in the Estonian language skills of non-Estonians
over the next few years. The goal is for Estonian to be not only the
official language but the predominant language of communication in
society. Another goal is that all graduates of non-Estonian basic schools
will pass an Estonian language and civics exam, which, for non-citizens,
would be equal to the citizenship exam.
- adaptation of non-Estonians to the Estonian cultural sphere and
their active participation in society. The goal is to reduce the barriers,
which hinder the competitiveness of non-Estonians in the labour market
and the public life. It is also to create more favourable conditions for
their more widespread participation in non-governmental associations,
cultural activities and international relations.
- reduction of regional isolation of non-Estonians. The mobility of
Estonians and non-Estonians within the state should be stimulated and
supported in order to change the current trend in which predominantly
non-Estonian regions (particularly Eastern-Virumaa) are preserved. The
goal is to create multicultural and open social environment in Eastern-
Virumaa.
- political integration of non-Estonian Estonian citizens in the
legislative and executive branches of government. A precondition for
the democratic development of Estonia is the emergence of political
pluralism independent of national identity, where voting in elections
does not follow ethnic lines, rather is based on ideological differences
and socio-economic interests.
Re-independent Estonia has been successful above all due to its bold steps
and unorthodox solutions. The time is ripe to take such steps in policy
related to non-Estonians as well. Estonia’s goal is to develop a European,
integrated society. Attainment of this goal requires that clear domestic
policy goals be established and that we work hard to achieve them.
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Table 1
Ethnic Composition of the Estonian Population*
(persons, according to census data)
Year Total
population
Ethnic
Estonians
Other ethnic
origin
Of which ethnic
Russians
1922 1,107,059 969,976 137,083 91,109
1934 1,126,413 992,520 132,327 92,656
1934** 1,061,313 972,750 87,049 50,080
1959 1,196,791 892,653 304,130 240,227
1970 1,356,079 925,157 430,908 334,620
1979 1,464,476 947,812 516,577 408,778
1989 1,565,662 963,281 602,374 474,834
1994*** 1,506,927 962,326 544,601 436,562
1995*** 1,491,583 957,948 533,635 428,360
1996*** 1,476,301 953,547 522,754 420,435
1998*** 1,451,489 946,646 504,843 409,111
Ethnic Composition of the Estonian Population*
(percentage of the whole population, according to census data)
Year Total
population
Ethnic
Estonians
Other ethnic
origin
Of which ethnic
Russians
1922 100 87.62 12.38 8.23
1934 100 88.11 11.75 8.23
1934** 100 91.66 8.2 4.72
1959 100 74.59 25.41 20.07
1970 100 68.22 31.78 24.68
1979 100 64.72 35.27 27.91
1989 100 61.53 38.47 30.33
1994*** 100 63.86 36.14 28.97
1995*** 100 64.22 35.78 28.72
1996*** 100 64.59 35.41 28.48
1998*** 100 65.22 34.78 28.19
* regardless of citizenship
** recalculation of the 1934 data according to the borders
     of the Estonian SSR in 1945
*** Data for 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998 are calculated as of 1 January by the
       Statistical Office of Estonia.
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Table 2
Estonian Population by Ethnic Origin and Ethnic Language as Mother Tongue
and Second Language (according to 1989 census)*
 No Ethnic origin Language groupTotal of which speaking their own ethnic
language
Total %
as mother tongueas second language
total %% total %%
Total population
Total 1565662 1471716 94,00 27616 1,76 149933295,76
    of which:
1 Estonian Finno-Ugrian 963281 953032 98,94 6079 0,63 95911199,57
2 Russian Slavic 474834 468216 98,61 5387 1,13 47360399,74
3 Ukrainian Slavic 48271 21320 44,17 8933 18,51 3025362,67
4 Belorussian Slavic 27711 8841 31,90 4703 16,97 1354448,88
5 Finnish Finno-Ugrian 16622 5155 31,01 … … … …
6 Jewish Germanic 4613 570 12,36 108 2,34 678 14,70
7 Tatar Turkic 4058 2248 55,40 456 11,24 270466,63
8 German Germanic 3466 1249 36,04 … … … …
9 Latvian Baltic 3135 1794 57,22 442 14,10 223671,32
10 Polish Slavic 3008 601 19,98 … … … …
11 Lithuanian Baltic 2568 1610 62,69 252 9,81 186272,51
12 Armenian Armenian 1669 837 50,15 170 10,19 100760,34
13 Azerbaijani Turkic 1238 869 70,19 79 6,38 948 76,58
14 Moldovan Romance 1215 663 54,57 146 12,02 809 66,58
15 Chuvash Turkic 1178 563 47,79 161 13,67 724 61,46
16 Mordvin Finno-Ugrian 985 367 37,26 134 13,60 501 50,86
17 Karelian Finno-Ugrian 881 262 29,74 129 14,64 391 44,38
18 Gypsy Indian 665 465 69,92 38 5,71 503 75,64
19 Georgian Kartveli 606 325 53,63 47 7,76 372 61,39
20 Uzbek Turkic 595 436 73,28 40 6,72 476 80,00
21 Kazakh Turkic 424 313 73,82 20 4,72 333 78,54
22 Udmurt Finno-Ugrian 413 153 37,05 47 11,38 200 48,43
23 Bashkir Turkic 371 186 50,13 40 10,78 226 60,92
24 Mari Finno-Ugrian 359 182 50,70 39 10,86 221 61,56
25 Ingrian Finno-Ugrian 306 74 24,18 31 10,13 105 34,31
26 Swedish Germanic 297 29 9,76 … … … …
27 Bulgarian Slavic 262 85 32,44 … … … …
28 Hungarian Finno-Ugrian 241 150 62,24 … … … …
29 Korean Korean 202 30 14,85 … … … …
30 Ossetian Iranian 201 85 42,29 19 9,45 104 51,74
31 Komi Finno-Ugrian 196 66 33,67 35 17,86 101 51,53
32 Greek Greek 182 28 15,38 … … … …
33 Lezgi Dagestani 178 124 69,66 9 5,06 133 74,72
34 Taijk Iranian 113 66 58,41 7 6,19 73 64,60
35 Turkmen Turkic 106 79 74,53 6 5,66 85 80,19
36 Romanian Romance 88 37 42,05 … … … …
37 Kyrgyz Turkic 81 61 75,31 7 8,64 68 83,95
38 Gagauz Turkic 69 33 47,83 6 8,70 39 56,52
39 Avar Dagestani 69 48 69,57 3 4,35 51 73,91
40 Buryat Mongolian 53 32 60,38 1 1,89 33 62,26
41 Kabardian Abkhazo-
Adyghian
47 28 59,57 5 10,64 33 70,21
42 Chechen Nakh 45 31 68,89 - - 31 68,89
43 Dargwa Dagestani 45 34 75,56 2 4,44 36 80,00
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44 Lakk Dagestani 43 33 76,74 3 6,98 36 83,72
45 Komi-Permyak Finno-Ugrian 38 12 31,58 4 10,53 16 42,11
46 Czech Slavic 37 12 32,43 … … … …
47 Vepsian Finno-Ugrian 37 7 18,92 7 18,92 14 37,84
48 Yakut Turkic 36 17 47,22 6 16,67 23 63,89
49 Kumyk Turkic 32 23 71,88 1 3,13 24 75,00
50 Kalmyk Mongolian 28 13 46,43 - - 13 46,43
51 Abkhaz Abkhazo-
Adyghian
25 16 64,00 - - 16 64,00
52 Turkish Turkic 23 8 34,78 … … … …
53 Karachay Turkic 23 11 47,83 3 13,04 14 60,87
54 Tati Iranian 22 13 59,09 - - 13 59,09
55 Circassian Abkhazo-
Adyghian
21 16 76,19 1 4,76 17 80,95
56 Ingush Nakh 19 13 68,42 1 5,26 14 73,68
57 Adyghian Abkhazo-
Adyghian
16 13 81,25 2 12,50 15 93,75
58 Serbian Slavic 14 3 21,43 … … … …
59 Khakass Turkic 14 8 57,14 1 7,14 9 64,29
60 Altai Turkic 14 10 71,43 - - 10 71,43
61 Kurdish Iranian 13 8 61,54 … … … …
62 Uighur Turkic 12 9 75,00 … … … …
63 Crimean Tatar Turkic 12 6 50,00 1 8,33 7 58,33
64 Arab Semitic 11 9 81,82 … … … …
65 Mountain JewishIranian 11 2 18,18 1 9,09 3 27,27
66 Nenets Samoyed 11 5 45,45 1 9,09 6 54,55
67 Dutch Germanic 10 2 20,00 … … … …
68 Nogay Turkic 10 5 50,00 1 10,00 6 60,00
69 Spanish Romance 10 3 30,00 … … … …
70 French Romance 10 3 30,00 … … … …
71 Tabasaran Dagestani 10 8 80,00 - - 8 80,00
72 Chinese Chinese 8 - - … … … …
73 Balkar Turkic 8 7 87,50 - - 7 87,50
74 Assyrian Semitic 8 3 37,50 … … … …
75 Abaza Abkhazo-
Adyghian
6 2 33,33 - - 2 33,33
76 Nanai Manchu 6 2 33,33 1 16,67 3 50,00
77 Austrian Germanic 5 - - … … … …
78 Karaim Turkic 5 - - - - - -
79 Karakalpak Turkic 5 1 20,00 - - 1 20,00
80 Persian Iranian 5 - - … … … …
81 Lapp Finno-Ugrian 5 2 40,00 - - 2 40,00
82 Khanty Finno-Ugrian 5 4 80,00 - - 4 80,00
83 Shor Turkic 4 - - - - - -
84 English Germanic 4 - - … … … …
85 Tuvinian Turkic 4 3 75,00 1 25,00 4 100,0
86 Even Manchu 4 1 25,00 - - 1 25,00
87 Slovak Slavic 4 2 50,00 … … … …
88 American Germanic 4 - - … … … …
89 Tsakhur Dagestani 4 4 100,00 - - 4 100,0
90 Danish Germanic 3 - - … …
91 Italian Romance 3 - - … …
92 Central Asian
Jewis
Iranian 3 1 33,33 - - 1 33,33
93 Croatian Slavic 3 3 100,00 … … … …
94 Cuban Romance 3 1 33,33 … … … …
95 Itelmen Paleo-Asiatic 3 - - - - - -
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96 Georgian JewishKartveli 3 1 33,33 - - 1 33,33
97 Swiss Germanic 2 - - … … … …
98 Indian and
Pakistani
Indian 2 1 50,00 … … … …
99 Vietnamese Vietnamese 2 2 100,00 … … … …
100Guatemalan Romance 2 1 50,00 … … … …
101Angolan Romance 2 2 100,00 … … … …
102Rongao Vietnamese 2 2 100,00 … … … …
103Crimean JewishTurkic 1 - - - - - -
104Khalkha-MongolMongolian 1 - - … … … …
105Mansi Finno-Ugrian 1 - - - - - -
106Oroch Manchu 1 - - - - - -
107Guinean Romance 1 1 100,00 … … … …
108Albanian Albanian 1 - - … … … …
109Livonian Finno-Ugrian 1 - - - - - -
110Nganasan Samoyed 1 1 100,00 - - 1 100,0
111Brazilian Romance 1 1 100,00 … … … …
112Walloon Romance 1 - - … … … …
113Eskimo Eskimo 1 1 100,00 - - 1 100,0
114Ket Ket 1 - - - - - -
115Creole Romance 1 - - … … … …
116Mozambican Romance 1 1 100,00 … … … …
117Nigerian Kwa 1 - - … … … …
118Norwegian Germanic 1 - - … … … …
119Selkup Samoyed 1 - - - - - -
120Rutul Dagestani 1 1 100,00 - - 1 100,0
121Chilean Romance 1 - - … … … …
Unknown 7 X X
Nationalities,
total
121 X X
… = data is not available
* Population of Estonia by Population Censuses, I, Statistical Office of Estonia, Tallinn,
1995, p. 106.
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 Table 3
The Education of Teachers of Estonian Language Working in Russian
Language Schools of Estonia
(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education as of 01 September 1996)
EDUCATION NUMBER
 OF
TEACHERS
%
 OF
TOTAL
NOTES
687 100 Teachers of Estonian language in only
Russian language general
comprehensive schools
1. WITH SPECIALISED
EDUCATION - total
138 20
1.1. Teachers of Estonian language for
Estonian language schools
67 9.7 Philologists of the Estonian language
and Estonian language teachers for
Estonian language schools
1.2. Teachers of Estonian language for
Russian language schools
40 5.8 Teachers of Estonian language for
Russian language schools, and those
who are acquiring that profession
additionally as a second higher
education through advanced courses
1.3. Primary school teachers - total 31 4.5 Primary school teachers for Estonian
language schools
1.3.1. Incl. with higher education 17
1.3.2. Special secondary education 14
2. OTHER PHILOLOGISTS – total 218 32
2.1. Graduates of Tartu University or
Tallinn Pedagogical University –
total
180 26
2.2. Graduated from other higher
educational establishment – total
38 6
3. OTHER PEDAGOGICAL
SPECIALITY – total
193 28
3.1. Graduated in Estonia  – total 133 19
3.2. Graduated elsewhere – total 54 8
3.3. Graduation place unknown – total 6 1
4. OTHER SPECIALITY – total 130 19
4.1. Higher education 61 9
4.2. Secondary special education 27 4
4.3. Secondary education 42 6
5. SPECIALITY UNKNOWN 8 1
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Table 4 (A;B)
A.
Teaching in the Estonian Language of Other Subjects at Russian
Language Schools in 1996/97* (Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)
City, county School Subject taught in
Estonian
Number of
pupils
Tallinn 1. Tallinn Secondary
School No. 14
art 65
Estonian literature 31
physical education 31
manual training 14
2. Tallinn Secondary
School No. 5
drawing 31
3. Tallinn Ehte Secondary
School
natural science 33
mathematics 11
4. Tallinn Pelguranna
Secondary School
Estonian literature 42
Estonian culture 29
Estonian history 12
5. Tallinn Secondary
School No. 40
regional studies 74
art 74
physical education 74
Estonian literature 363
Estonian history 16
reading 74
6. Tallinn Humanities
Gymnasium
geography 77
Estonian literature 64
7. Tallinn Secondary
School No. 45
regional studies 60
8. Tallinn Mustamäe
School of Sciences
Estonian literature 304
economics 13
9. Tallinn Mustamäe
School of Humanities
physical education 32
manual training 14
10.Tallinn Mustamäe Gen.
Comprehensive School
regional studies 27
music 117
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physical education 87
technical drawing 117
manual training 87
11.Haabersti Russian
Private Gymnasium
regional studies 87
cultural studies 9
Estonian history 19
Estonian literature 56
Kohtla-Järve
city
12.Kohtla-Järve Vahtra
Basic School
regional studies 82
biology 28
geography. incl.
Estonian geography
29
mathematics 50
art 50
handicraft 50
physical education 50
13.Ahtme Gymnasium natural science 76
music 230
art 155
manual training 155
physical education 324
14.Kohtla-Järve Tammiku
Gymnasium
mathematics 67
Narva city 15.Narva Secondary School
No. 6
Estonian language and
literature
43
16.Pähklimäe Gymnasiumathematics 102
Tartu city 17.Tartu Secondary School
No. 13
regional studies 166
physical education 131
manual training 131
history 35
18.Russian Private School
"Gitika"
literature 32
Harjumaa 19.Kehra Secondary SchoolEstonian literature 42
Ida-Virumaa 20.Aseri Secondary SchoolEstonian literature 71
physical education 86
regional studies 33
music 86
Jõgevamaa 21.Mustvee Secondary
School No. 2
Estonian literature 24
Läänemaa 22.Haapsalu Russian
Gymnasium
manual training 31
physical education 31
50
art 31
music 169
Lääne-
Virumaa
23.Rakvere Russian
Gymnasium
Estonian literature 26
regional studies 26
24.Tamsalu Gymnasiumart 39
manual training 30
physical education 38
Pärnumaa 25.Sindi Secondary SchoolEstonian literature 47
Tartumaa 26.Ulila Basic School handicraft 12
art 21
technical drawing 9
manual training 36
Viljandimaa 27.Viljandi Russian
Gymnasium
music 12
physical education 58
Võrumaa 28.Võru Secondary School
No. 2
regional studies 20
* There were 59,240 pupils studying Estonian at 129 Russian
language schools
      B.
Teaching in the Estonian Language of Other Subjects at Russian
Language Schools in 1996/97**
Subject taught in the Estonian language Number of
schools
Estonian literature and reading 14
Physical education 11
Manual training and handicraft 10
Regional studies 9
Art 6
Music 5
Estonian history and culture 5
Geography, economics and cultural studies 4
Mathematics 4
Natural science and biology 3
Drawing and technical drawing 3
      ** Composed and calculated on the basis of Table 4A by François Grin of ECMI.
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Table 5
Language Used at Home of the First Grade Pupils of the Estonian
Language Schools (school year of 1996/97)
(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)
County
Pupils studying
in while their language used at home is:
the Estonian
language
Estonian % other
language
%
Estonia total 14112 13343 94,55 769 5,45
   Bigger cities:
Tallinn 3190 2975 93,26 215 6,74
 including
     Haabersti                     239 216 90,38 23 9,62
      Kesklinn 765 721 94,25 44 5,75
      Kristiine 206 193 93,69 13 6,31
      Lasnamäe 575 519 90,26 56 9,74
      Mustamäe 573 539 94,07 34 5,93
      Nõmme 424 415 97,88 9 2,12
      Pirita 90 87 96,67 3 3,33
      Põhja-Tallinn 318 285 89,62 33 10,38
Tartu 1279 1240 96,95 39 3,05
Pärnu* … … … … …
Narva 27 11 40,74 16 59,26
Kohtla-Järve 157 76 48,41 81 51,59
Sillamäe 11 7 63,64 4 36,36
   Counties
Harjumaa 1559 1479 94,87 80 5,13
Hiiumaa 200 199 99,50 1 0,50
Ida-Virumaa 364 316 86,81 48 13,19
Jõgevamaa* … … … … …
Järvamaa 709 695 98,03 14 1,97
Lääne-Virumaa 1055 988 93,65 67 6,35
Läänemaa 487 407 83,57 80 16,43
Põlvamaa 551 537 97,46 14 2,54
Pärnumaa 787 769 97,71 18 2,29
Raplamaa* … … … … …
Saaremaa 714 711 99,58 3 0,42
Tartumaa 704 663 94,18 41 5,82
Valgamaa 583 557 95,54 26 4,46
Viljandimaa 1002 990 98,80 12 1,20
Võrumaa 733 723 98,64 10 1,36
  *   ...  -  no data was provided
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Table 6
Number of Persons Passing the Language Proficiency Examination
Required for Employment, as of 01 August 1997
(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)
Location 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Tallinn 3,145 7,621 1,6489 7,974 6,646 4,477 285 46,637
Narva 257 1,255 3,913 4,112 3,099 1,566 768 14,969
Ida-
Virumaa
1,217 1,353 4,938 3,081 2,606 1,479 - 14,674
Läänemaa - 101 482 151 154 86 - 974
Tartumaa - - 128 225 159 135 92 739
Jõgeva - 89 141 30 18 - - 278
Rapla - 6 95 6 - - - 107
Harjumaa - 2 1,171 - - - - 1,173
Lääne-
Virumaa
39 172 764 575 349 10 - 1,909
Pärnumaa - 5 63 - - - - 68
Järvamaa - 51 148 1 10 - - 210
Saaremaa 3 - 35 3 8 - - 49
Võru - 24 17 34 16 - - 91
Põlva - 20 239 - - - - 259
Pärnu 43 170 1,423 250 89 57 31 2,063
Tartu - 551 1,928 514 323 131 - 3,447
Viljandi 122 119 187 5 1 - - 434
Valga - 395 694 51 90 - - 1,230
Hiiumaa - - 7 - - - - 7
TOTAL 4,826 11,934 32,862 17,012 13,568 7,940 1,176 89,318
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Table 7
Number of Persons Taking the Estonian Language Examination for
Citizenship Applicants under the New Citizenship Law
(enacted 01 April 1995) as of 01 April 1997
(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)
Date of
Examination
Number of
Applicants
Passed the
Examination
Success Rate
%
Sept.-Dec. 1995 168 149 88.69
1996
January 278 243 87.41
February 247 210 85.02
March 383 317 82.77
April 414 348 84.06
May 410 332 80.98
June 423 357 84.40
July 252 222 88.10
August 169 116 68.64
September 304 235 77.30
October 296 213 71.96
November 245 215 87.76
December 243 196 80.66
Total: 1995-1996 3,832 3,153 82.28
1997
January 264 195 73.86
February 309 255 82.52
March 299 247 82.61
Total 1997 872 697 79.93
Total 1995-1997 4,704 3,850 81.84
